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Reducing the risks posed by Dutch returnees from Syria by transferring Germany’s 
experiences in their fight against the radical right to the Netherlands. 
 
By:  Henrique Franssens1  
 
Abstract 
This article investigates one aspect of what the Dutch government can do to reduce the risks posed by Dutch 
jihadists who are currently fighting in Syria. The Dutch government has developed a comprehensive action 
programme to combat jihadism which outlines measures designed to combat the jihadist movement in the 
Netherlands. The comprehensive action programme includes plans to develop an exit facility to help people 
leaving the jihadist movement. Furthermore, a support facility needs to be created, based on the German 
network model. Of this network the Hayat programme will be analysed in-depth together with the EXIT-
Deutschland programme. Hayat is a civil society programme that includes working with relatives of 
radicalised individuals and tries to de-radicalise these individuals. Hayat’s programme is amongst others 
based on experiences gained from EXIT-Deutschland, a de-radicalisation programme focusing on de-
radicalising individual members of the radical right movement. The exit-facility that the Dutch government 
wants to create and the support facility are only explained vaguely and have not yet been introduced. This 
research investigates how and to what extent Hayat’s and EXIT-Deutschland’s elements can successfully be 
transferred to the Netherlands. This research recommends focusing on disengaging instead of de-
radicalisation. The programme should be executed by an NGO with expert witness status. Furthermore, an 
active approach to contacting returnees is considered best in line with the Dutch government’s objectives. 
Important elements of the German programme can be transferred to the Netherlands. These elements 
include using a personal approach, providing returnees with alternatives and family counselling, and 
generally - apart from the already existing repressive measures - focusing on positive measures. This article 
also outlines the ways in which such a transfer of best practises can be best achieved. 
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Introduction 
This article investigates certain measures that the Dutch government can implement 
to reduce the risks posed by returned Dutch jihadists who were fighting in Syria. The 
number of foreign fighters in Syria has increased exponentially and is a growing concern, 
also for Dutch policy makers (Bakker, et al, 2013). Syria is the number one jihadist 
destination and jihadist battlefield in the world.2 Returning jihadists are considered a threat 
by the Dutch government since they could, for example, prepare and even carry out 
terrorist attacks. It is assumed that the returnees have most probably developed more radical 
ideas and gained fighting experience. Therefore the government has announced in The 
Netherlands comprehensive action programme to combat jihadism that it is developing new 
programmes and measures aimed at deterring Dutch jihadists. The action programme has 
three comprehensive objectives, namely to protect the democracy and the rule of law, to 
combat and weaken the jihadist movement in the Netherlands, and to remove the breeding 
ground for radicalisation (Ministry of Security and Justice, 2014: 2). The comprehensive 
action programme includes plans to develop an exit facility to help people leaving the jihadi 
movement. Furthermore, a support facility needs to be created, based on the German Hayat 
programme (Ministry of Security and Justice, 2014: 8-17). The German Hayat programme 
is a civil society programme that focuses on the environment of highly radicalised 
individuals and foreign fighters, and tries to de-radicalise them. The programme is based on 
experiences gained from EXIT-Deutschland, a de-radicalisation programme focusing on de-
radicalising individual neo-Nazi’s (Koehler, 2013: 185). German governmental institutions 
and NGOs have developed various policies and practices and have taken different 
                                                 
2
 Barnard, A. and E. Schmitt (2013), ‘As Foreign Fighters Flood Syria, Fears of a New Extremist Haven’, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/09/world/middleeast/as-foreign-fighters-flood-syria-fears-of-a-new-extremist-
haven.html?_r=0 (visited on May 2th 2014).   
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measures aimed at combating the radical movements. The Hayat programme is part of a 
German nationwide counselling network of which three other NGO’s are also part of. This 
German model is government financed and organised by a public-private partnership 
between the ministry of the interior and four NGOs. The facilities that the Dutch 
government wants to create based on the Hayat programme and the exit-facility are only 
explained vaguely. Therefore, we do not know to what extent the Dutch authorities are 
willing to copy the Hayat programme and how they want to develop the exit facility. This 
research will investigate to what extent the German main elements can be successfully be 
applied in the Netherlands. This leads to the explanatory research question: To what extent 
can the main elements developed by the Hayat and EXIT-Deutschland institutions, aimed at 
reducing the risks posed by radicals, effectively be transferred to the Netherlands?  
In order to investigate this we have to find out whether programmes like the Hayat 
and EXIT-Deutschland (EXIT) can be transferred to the Netherlands. Therefore we will 
firstly start with a short theoretical introduction (part one). The theoretical introduction will 
contain the policy transfer theory. Subsequently, in paragraph 1.2, we will focus on the de-
radicalisation and disengagement theory. This is important in order to find out what the best 
way is to deal with Dutch returnees. Therefore it will be investigated what has been 
researched so far regarding the effects of different programmes. Thereafter, in paragraph 
1.3, the danger of Dutch jihadists coming home from Syria will be discussed. It is important 
to know to what extent these returnees do form a threat to society when returning home. 
 Then, in part two, will be analysed which similarities can be identified between 
right-wing radicals in Germany and Dutch jihadists. This is important to determine to what 
extent these two groups can be compared and if German measures targeting right-wing 
radicals can also be transferred to Dutch jihadi returnees. Thereafter, in paragraph 2.2 this 
research will investigate which are the main elements of the Hayat and EXIT programmes. 
This is necessary to determine on which policies and practices this research should focus. 
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Here, attention will be given to the way of working of Hayat and EXIT and their 
environment in which they operate. Here, special attention goes to the body of academic 
literature on radicalisation and de-radicalisation provided in 1.2. In paragraph 2.3 this 
research will investigate whether Hayat’s and EXIT’s main elements can be applied in the 
Netherlands. It will be made clear which of their main elements can indeed be applied to 
Dutch returnees, as additional instruments to be used in conjunction with existing plans. 
The conditions for successful policy transfer will be investigated, in order to determine if 
effective policy transfer is possible in this case. Therefore, this section will analyse this issue 
on the basis of the policy transfer theory provided in paragraph 1.1. The hypotheses stated 
by Rose with regard to the policy transfer theory and the conditions given by Stone, 
Dolowitz and Marsh will be the main sources used in the analysis.  
 Part three, the conclusion, will answer the central research question and give some 
policy recommendations and practical implications of the research. Furthermore it will 
discuss the limitations of the research findings and discuss possible avenues for future 
research.  
 
Part 1: Theoretical introduction  
1.1 Policy transfer theory 
In order to determine whether Hayat’s and EXIT-Deutschland’s policies and 
practices can be transferred to the Netherlands, this research will use the policy transfer 
theory. According to Dolowitz and Marsh, policy transfer and lesson drawing refers to a 
“process in which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and 
ideas in one political setting (past or present) is used in the development of policies, 
administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political setting” (Dolowitz , 
et al, 2000: 5). In order to determine how you can ‘import’ policies from another country, 
this research will use, amongst others, Rose’s theory regarding policy transfer. Rose 
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describes that “finding a programme that has brought political satisfaction elsewhere does 
not guarantee that it can be transferred effectively” (Rose, 1991: 5). So, under what 
circumstances and to what extent can a programme that has proven to be effective in one 
place be transferred to another place? To a certain extent each country has unique problems 
associated with its own time and place in history. 
  
Ways of lesson drawing 
Rose states that there are five alternative ways of drawing a lesson and transferring it, 
namely: copying, emulation, hybridisation, synthesis and inspiration (Rose, 1991: 21-22). 
Copying is “adoption more or less intact of a programme already in effect in another 
jurisdiction” (Rose, 1991: 22). Copying something from elsewhere is difficult since it 
assumes that the circumstances and context are the same. Emulation as a means of lesson 
drawing assumes that a programme elsewhere provides the best standards for designing 
legislation at home. Emulation implies the adoption of a programme including adjustments 
for different circumstances in another jurisdiction, so it rejects the idea of copying every 
detail. Hybridisation combines different elements of programmes from two different places. 
Synthesis combines familiar elements of programmes from more than two different places. 
And finally, the inspiration method of lesson drawing uses programmes elsewhere as 
intellectual stimulus for developing a new programme without an analogue elsewhere. 
According to Dolowitz and Marsh (2000: 13) “the type of transfer involved in any 
particular case depends upon factors such as who is involved in the process and where 
within the policy-making process transfer occurs. Thus, it is possible that, while politicians 
tend to look for “quick-fix” solutions and thus rely upon copying or emulation, bureaucrats, 
on the other hand, are probably more interested in mixtures.”  
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Actors 
In addition to different ways of lesson drawing, it is important to investigate which 
actors are involved in the transfer policy. According to Dolowitz and Marsh (1996: 345) 
there are six main categories of actors involved in the transfer policy process. These are 
elected officials, political parties, bureaucrats/civil servants, pressure groups, policy 
entrepreneurs/experts and supra-national institutions. More than one of these actors can be 
involved in the transfer of policies. Apart from the advocacy of lessons, policy entrepreneurs 
and experts are important in order to build a (inter)national network of contacts. This way 
experts communicate with others from inside and outside the government to spread ideas 
(Dolowitz, et al, 1996: 345-346). Supra-national organisations are involved in the policy 
transfer since they stimulate other nations to compare elements of foreign programmes that 
they may wish to copy. One of the areas that Stone (2004: 545) focuses on is the role of 
actors in the transfer policy process. According to Stone, actors that should be included are 
international organisations, states and non-state actors. So, the actors in transfer policy are 
very broad and consist of individuals, networks and organisations. The key actors involved 
in the transfer policy are according to Stone international organisations and non-state actors 
(e.g. interest groups, NGO’s, think tanks, consultant firms, law firms and banks). These non-
state actors have been shown to have a lot of influence on setting agendas and should not be 
forgotten in our efforts to understand the transfer policy process (Stone, 2004: 550).  
 
Success factors 
Knowing which actors could be involved and the possible ways of policy transfer, we 
need to investigate what the different factors are that can constrain policy transfer 
(Dolowitz, et al, 1996: 353). According to Rose (1988: 227-228) the following six 
hypotheses are of interest: 
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1. Programmes with single goals are easier to transfer than programmes with multiple 
goals. 
2. The simpler the problem, the more likely transfer is to occur.   
3. The more direct the relationship between the problem and the solution, the more 
likely it is that transfer will occur. 
4. The fewer the perceived side effects a policy has, the more likely transfer will occur. 
5. The more information agents have about the functioning of a programme in another 
country, the easier it is to transfer. 
6. The more easily outcomes can be predicted, the simpler a programme is to transfer.  
 
In addition to this, another of Stone’s remarks has to be taken into account. She argues 
that ‘soft’ forms of transfer policy (e.g. the spread of norms and knowledge) are needed as a 
complement to the ‘hard’ transfer of policy tools, structures and practices (Stone, 2004: 
546). With the ‘soft’ policy transfer non-state actors do play a more prominent role. 
According to Stone, non-state actors are better at transferring the ‘soft’ forms, influencing 
public opinion and policy agendas. On the other hand officials are more involved with the 
‘hard’ transfer of policy tools, such as formal decision-making, legislation and regulation 
(Stone, 2004: 556).    
 
Policy failure 
Although the aim of policy transfer is to be a ‘success’, with the underlying assumption 
being that policies that are successful in one country will also be successful in the other, it is 
not always the case. As Rose (1991: 5) stated, to a certain extent each country has unique 
problems related to its own place and time. Dolowitz and Marsh give three factors that are 
of significance with regard to policy failure. The first is the process of uninformed transfer, 
which states that the borrowing country does not have enough information about the 
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policy/institutions and exactly how it operates in the country borrowed from. Second, is the 
incomplete transfer. When this is the case, crucial elements for success are not transferred, 
which leads to failure. The third and last factor is inappropriate transfer. Here, too little 
attention has been given to the contexts and differences between the two countries. This 
could refer to economic, social, political and ideological contexts (Dolowitz, et al, 2000: 17).  
 
1.2 Ways to develop de-radicalisation programmes 
In order to find out what the best way is to deal with Dutch jihadist returnees, it is 
important to investigate what has been researched so far regarding the effects of different 
programmes. Based on the interviews and literature it seems that the discussions whether 
institutions should focus on changing somebodies ideology (de-radicalising) or only change 
somebodies behaviour (disengaging) are the key issues for establishing an institution 
focussing on radicals.   
 
De-radicalisation and disengagement 
There are different views concerning what can be considered as successful de-
radicalisation. Do we consider people de-radicalised when they stop killing others? Do we 
consider people de-radicalised when they no longer have any contact with a radical group? 
Or do we only consider people de-radicalised when they have stopped having radical ideas? 
 Bjørgo and Horgan approach de-radicalisation from a scientific perspective. They 
state that disengaged people are not necessarily de-radicalised. Should the programmes only 
emphasise the changing behaviour that is related to (militant) radical-right groups or should 
we also focus on the whole mind-set and therefore try to change the radical ideological 
values? Many programmes are based on the idea that an ideological change is only possible 
if the radical group is left behind. But only leaving the group behind does not necessarily 
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mean that a person is prepared to give up his or her radicalised thoughts and values (Bjørgo, 
et al, 2009). There is a real danger of ideologies popping-up after a while if programmes do 
not pay sufficient attention to ideology. According to Van Donselaar this sometimes 
happens. After World War II the climate was difficult for former Nazi supporters, and 
there was a very negative reaction and revulsion towards Nazi ideas in society, so many 
people with radical Nazi sympathies, especially those with children, kept quiet. When the 
children grew older, the parents started expressing their Nazi ideas again. There were also 
cases of people who were salary men after WW II and only started expressing their old 
radical ideas and values when began receiving their pensions (Interview Van Donselaar). So 
de-radicalisation focuses on changing radical ideological values, attitudes and views. 
Disengagement focuses on only changing radical behaviour without changing the 
ideological values, attitudes and views.3 
 
De-radicalisation or disengagement? 
In order to decide whether we should focus on de-radicalising or disengaging, the 
first step should be to find out to what extent the degree of ideology plays a part. As stated 
later, and also according to Silke (2011), the degree of ideological belief does often not seem 
to be the main indicator of whether or not somebody is likely to get involved in a terrorist 
organisation. If the aim of the de-radicalisation/disengagement programmes is to reduce the 
risk that a person presents to society, maybe disengagement is enough. Should we therefore 
only focus on disengagement? It may be true that people do not enter radical movements 
because of their radical ideology, but once they are in the radical movement, they can 
develop radical ideas. According to the General Intelligence and Security Service of the 
                                                 
3
 General Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands (2010), https://toolbox-
extremisme.nctv.nl/documentatie/onderzoeken/disengagement-en-deradicalisering-van-jihadisten-in-nederland 
(visited on October 20th 2014). 
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Netherlands, disengagement does happen more frequently with jihadists than de-
radicalisation.4 When they disengage, jihadists stop their radical behaviour but continue to 
support the jihadist ideology. They will not contradict jihadist thoughts, will continue 
having radical contacts and will not stop others from committing terrorist attacks. When 
jihadists do de-radicalise, this is almost always preceded by disengagement. De-
radicalisation is therefore not a prerequisite for disengagement. However, the opposite can 
also happen; somebody starts changing his or her behaviour (disengaging) and finally starts 
to lose faith in their radical ideology (de-radicalising). The factors that play a part when 
jihadists disengage or de-radicalise include personal, external and group factors. Personal 
factors always play a part in disengagement or de-radicalisation. This includes having a 
partner, a job, a child, etc. The external factors can include a lot of other things such as 
police intervention or the involvement of a family member. Group factors, e.g. the arrest of a 
group’s leader, influence the whole network the individual belongs to.5 All these conditions 
can influence which path jihadists choose to follow. However, this does not mean that 
personal factors necessarily change their radical thoughts. The influence of ideology is 
unclear. According to the Dutch secret service, contradicting the ideology does not seem to 
be of added value, since arguments are pushed aside or sometimes not even noticed by the 
radical. In cases of successful de-radicalisation, personal and external factors had a huge 
impact, and the alternative (de-radicalised) thought only started to play a part at a later 
stage.6 According to Silke (2011), the most successful proven disengagement programmes in 
the last fifty years were implemented in Spain and Italy in the eighties. The circumstances 
                                                 
4
 General Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands (2010), https://toolbox-
extremisme.nctv.nl/documentatie/onderzoeken/disengagement-en-deradicalisering-van-jihadisten-in-nederland 
(visited on October 20th 2014). 
5
 General Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands (2010), https://toolbox-
extremisme.nctv.nl/documentatie/onderzoeken/disengagement-en-deradicalisering-van-jihadisten-in-nederland 
(visited on October 20th 2014). 
6
 General Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands (2010), https://toolbox-
extremisme.nctv.nl/documentatie/onderzoeken/disengagement-en-deradicalisering-van-jihadisten-in-nederland 
(visited on October 20th 2014). 
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were totally different but both programmes focused solely on disengagement and not on 
changing attitudes and opinions. Furthermore the (terrorist) participants voluntarily agreed 
to participate in the project: “the terrorists who took part had already made the decision to 
change before they applied to the programme. The programme did not convince them that 
continued life as a terrorist was wrong or unjustified; rather, it allowed them access to a third 
way once they had already reached that decision for themselves” (Silke, 2011: 19). 
However, unlike the programmes in Spain and Italy, ideology and thoughts have become a 
central element of modern programmes.  
EXIT claims to be one of the world’s most successful de-radicalisation and 
disengagement programmes for right-wing extremists, however this research has not find 
any objective external evaluation of this statement (Koehler, 2013: 185). Although it is too 
early to say, according to Koehler the focus on the ideology of the Hayat programme is also 
one of the success factors of their programmes (interview Koehler). Daniel Koehler worked 
for Hayat and EXIT-Deutschland and was the head of Research for those organisations and 
is currently the Director of the German Institute on Radicalisation and De-radicalisation 
Studies GIRDS in Berlin (the viewpoints expressed in the interview with Koehler are solely 
his own, based on his knowledge and experience and do not necessarily represent the 
official viewpoint of EXIT-Deutschland and Hayat). With ideology is meant (Hall, 1996: 
25-26) “the mental frameworks–the languages, the concepts, categories, imagery of thought, 
and the systems of representation–which different classes and social groups deploy in order 
to make sense of, figure out and render intelligible the way society works”. Koehler states 
that if you do not focus on the ideology, people could re-radicalise in another group. 
 According to Speckhard (2010: 11) successful programmes “must find a way to 
successfully sort through and identify prisoners or detainees according to their level of 
radicalization”. Depending on the degree of radicalisation, the programme needs to be 
adjusted to take account of both the original and the current motivators. Radicals must be 
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approached contextually and attention should be given to subjects that are important to 
them (e.g. violation of sacred values, desire for revenge, discrimination, etc.). Special 
attention needs to be given to the factors that got them involved. Furthermore it is important 
to pay close attention to what happens to the returnee after they have disengaged or de-
radicalised, including, for example, participation in job programmes. Skill training can be 
provided in areas such as computers, languages and literacy, which make it easier to get a job 
(Speckhard, 2010: 10-11). According to Speckhard ways to disengage or de-radicalise 
individuals could be, among others, through intimidation, imprisonment and amnesty 
programmes, providing activities that attract radicals away from violence into non-violent 
activities and de-radicalising prisoners through prison programmes (Speckhard, 2010: 2). 
Speckhard maintains that jihadists will continue to have radical thoughts if they are only 
disengaged. They could still form a danger to society since disengaged radicals appear to re-
engage easily (Speckhard, 2010: 2). Gadd (2006: 180) also states that any effective de-
radicalisation programme has to emphasize the de-legitimisation and invalidation of the 
relevant narratives and interpretations. Furthermore, the radical ideology has to be 
dismantled during the de-radicalisation process and the individual has to arrive at a critical 
self-assessment of his or her past. According to Horgan and Braddock (2010) the 
effectiveness of de-radicalisation programmes increases substantially when the ideological 
dimension is included. 
 
Providing alternatives 
According to the senior policy maker (interview) – and as Daniel Koehler states – 
providing returnees with alternatives is a key element in diminishing the danger that 
somebody could present to society. Reducing this danger is Dutch government’s only aim 
(interview Senior policy maker). It provides a way in which to establish an alternative 
reference group, which helps to take individuals out of their old environment. This method 
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also provides a way of breaking through the radicalised individual’s ideological isolation and 
encouraging him or her to abandon radical structures.     
 Bakker argues that the Dutch government should be careful about adopting policies 
towards returnees which are too strict, since there is not only one type of returnee. If you 
approach every returnee in a manner based on the worst case scenario, and you therefore 
treat them as potential terrorists, you run the risk of creating distrust and unnecessarily 
strengthening enemy images. Returning jihadists will react accordingly. This approach can 
unwittingly lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy (Bakker, 2013: 4). It is better to focus on 
positive measures and to a lesser extent on repressive measures. In Germany, different kinds 
of repressive measures, such as banning manifestations, flags, symbols, etc. have also 
produced negative results. For example, banning radical-right music bands and locking up 
the artists increased the band’s popularity by giving them cult status in the scene. Repressive 
measures have so far been unable to stop the growth of radical-right violence and therefore 
more preventive measures are being introduced. According to Koehler (interview), if the 
government automatically labels and therefore punishes all the returnees as ‘terrorists’, 
family members and close friends will be less likely to approach (governmental) 
organisations. This could be quite worrying since according to all people who were 
interviewed, friends and family members of returnees are an indispensable part of the 
successful monitoring of returnees. Without contact with the returnee’s immediate 
environment, the government will not be able to deal effectively with the returnees.  
 
1.3 The danger of Dutch jihadists coming home  
Combating radicalisation is an important element in the fight against Dutch jihadists 
as described in The Netherlands comprehensive action programme to combat jihadism 
(Ministry of Security and Justice, 2014: 3). There are different reasons why the Dutch 
government wants to prevent the journey to Syria and increase control of the jihadists 
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returning from Syria. As discussed, authorities try to combat jihadists because they believe 
that jihadists can become a threat to national security when they return to the Netherlands 
after internalising (more) dangerous radical ideas and gaining fighting experience. National 
security is at stake when vital interests of the state and/or the society are threatened in such 
a way that there is (potential) societal disruption. National security includes both breach of 
security by deliberate human action (security) and damage by disasters, system or process 
errors, human errors or natural anomalies such as extreme weather (safety).7 On return to 
the Netherlands, jihadists could help to prepare attacks or even execute them. According to 
the authorities, the jihadists are a threat to national security since they have anti-democratic 
beliefs and are prepared to use extreme violence to combat the ‘enemies’ of Islam or even 
destroy them.8 According to the director of United States government’s National 
Counterterrorism Centre, Matthew Olsen, jihadists might return to Europe or the USA as 
part of a global jihadist movement.9 Since the nineteen fifties large numbers of Muslims 
have been living in Europe, including in the Netherlands. Muslim immigrants came mainly 
as “guest-labourers” from Turkey and North Africa (Pittomvils, 1997: 432). A study 
showed that 71 percent of young Muslims in the Netherlands see their friends who are 
fighting in Syria, as “heroes defending Muslims and fighting against the brutal regime of 
Bashar Assad”.10 
It is rather difficult to find a clear answer as to whether and to what extent returning 
jihadists form a threat to Dutch society after having fought in Syria and returned home. 
According to different media and governmental sources it is clear that Dutch jihadists in 
                                                 
7
 Strategie Nationale veiligheid (2009), file://vuw/Personal$/Homes/09/s0962309/Downloads/kst-30821-3-
b1%20(5).pdf (visited on May 5th 2014).  
8
 General Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands (2015), 
https://www.aivd.nl/publicaties/@3114/transformation/  (visited on April 11
th
 2015). 
9
 Atlas, T. (2013), ‘Foreign Fighters Flocking to Syria Stirs Terror Concerns’, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-
07-19/u-s-stakes-in-syria-grow-as-radicals-rally-to-the-fight.html  (visited on April 11
th
 2015). 
10
 Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Informaiton Center (2014), http://www.terrorism-
info.org.il/en/article/20616 (visited on April 11th 2014).  
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general can form a threat when returning to the Netherlands. According to the Royal 
Netherlands Marechaussee, returnees from Syria do form a risk to Dutch society since they 
are willing to sacrifice their lives for the Islamic cause. Furthermore they have practical 
fighting experience and have undergone specific training. Moreover, the jihadists have a 
reduced tolerance regarding Western norms and values and they behave in an anti-
integrative manner concerning Dutch society. Furthermore, the jihadists have an high status 
within their own sub-society and act there as role models. Also, returnees can have 
psychological problems due to their experience of fighting in Syria. And finally, the 
returnees can provoke unrest within the moderate immigrant communities (Royal 
Netherlands Marechaussee, 2013: 1). According to Daniel Koehler, it would not make 
sense for so many jihadists to come back and attack the Netherlands. They go to Syria 
because they want to fight abroad in a specific context, his assumption being that the 
conflict is theologically tied to the geographical region. It would make more sense for the 
jihadists to stay there, to fight or to die since many jihadists want to die as a martyr. Another 
possibility would be to go to another battlefield where the Muslim community is being 
attacked or suppressed, which is in fact what many of them do. It would not make sense to 
come back and attack the Netherlands. It would make more sense to return, collect money, 
and recruit more people. Koehler is therefore not convinced that the group of returning 
jihadists form a real security risk (interview Koehler). What Koehler does believe can 
happen is that jihadists who come back may be severely traumatised, have no clear vision or 
future, no job, and may be very frustrated from their battlefield experiences, but no one 
seems to care. If this is what the jihadists return to, and they receive no help or guidance, 
they may fall into a black hole and decide to go back to their radical group. If returning 
jihadists feel oppressed and are subject to harsh interrogation by the police, if they are 
treated as terrorists, this might be enough to push them precisely in that (radical) direction. 
According to Koehler jihadists return to their home country because they are demoralised, 
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shocked, and traumatised. In that respect one could see the return of jihadists as a sign of de-
radicalisation (interview Koehler). Furthermore, if returnees are dealt with as if they were 
terrorists, it would discourage family members from contacting authorities since this would 
have major consequences for them.         
 On the other hand, there is the case of Mohamed Merah. Merah, a Frenchman of 
Algerian origin, who fought in Afghanistan and Pakistan after being radicalised in a French 
prison, proves that returnees do pose a real threat. After returning to France, Merah killed 
several French soldiers and Jewish citizens. Furthermore, about twelve per cent of the 
terrorist attacks in Europe after 9/11 were committed by terrorists who had been trained or 
had been fighting abroad. Apart from direct terrorist attacks, the psychological problems of 
returnees can lead to other problems such as domestic violence, aggressive behaviour or 
suicidal tendencies (Bakker, 2013: 4).        
Thomas Hegghemmar from the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment states 
(Hegghammer, 2013) that around ten per cent of foreign fighters returning to their homes in 
the West, want to commit also attacks in the West. As well, according to Hegghammer most 
radicalised Muslims want to fight abroad and not in their home country in the West. But 
once abroad they get into a very isolated environment (no influences from modest views), or 
are sometimes specifically selected abroad and trained for terrorism in their home countries 
and are getting used to violence. According to Hegghemmer (2013: 11) several sources 
suggest that returnees are overrepresented when it comes to attacks in their home countries. 
According to Sageman networks including a jihadist veteran doubles the probability of a 
planned attack reaching execution (Sageman, 2010). Clarke and Soria (2010: 28) noted that 
“seven of the eight major terrorist plots in the UK included in their cells one or more 
individuals who had attended terrorist training camps”. Remarkable is however that 
stopping jihadists going abroad can also have a reverse affect. Hegghemmer (2013: 12) 
points out that it is known that several plot participants acted at home because their 
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travelling to foreign destinations was obstructed. In conclusion, around 90 per cent of the 
jihadists who return home after fighting in Syria, need probably special attention because 
they are e.g. traumatised, but the other 10 per cent can become very dangerous.  The 
challenge will be to identify this 10 per cent and to treat the 90 per cent with care 
(Hegghemmer, 2013).   
So, there are (potentially) dangerous and non-dangerous returning jihadists. There 
are returnees who will not form a problem when returning if they can be motivated to make 
something of their lives (Bakker, 2013: 4). According to Bakker, Paulussen and Entenmann 
we need to know a few things in order to make a good assessment of the potential risk of the 
returnees: we need to know their reasons for going to Syria and the people they were with, 
the type of activities they undertook in Syria and the location of the activities and their 
accomplices, the reason(s) for returning from Syria and lastly whether or not they have in 
fact returned and, if so, where they returned. Unfortunately, this information is quite hard 
to get despite the huge efforts by government agencies to improve the provision of 
information. Dutch authorities do not know the exact number of Dutch jihadists fighting in 
Syria, how many have died or have already returned, and they certainly do not know the 
role that the Dutch jihadists played in Syria, let alone whether they have been radicalised, 
disillusioned or traumatised (Bakker, et al, 2013: 6).      
 
Part 2: Analysis  
2.1 Comparing Dutch returnees and German radical right members 
This part will investigate which similarities can be identified between members of 
the German radical right and Dutch jihadi returnees from Syria. It is important to find out if 
and to what extent members of these two groups are similar enough to provide a basis for 
comparison, and whether or not German measures that target right-wing radicals are 
relevant and can be transferred regarding Dutch jihadi returnees. The similarities between 
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the two groups will be investigated by looking at various factors: the radicalisation process, 
background and the threat.  
 
The radicalisation process 
According to Koehler, the radicalisation process of Dutch jihadists and radical right 
members is in many respects quite similar, including the motivation for entry (interview 
Koehler). Although there are many ways and reasons why radical right members and 
jihadists join their movements, there are not many similarities between the jihadists and 
right-wing radical ideologies. According to Koehler, many people join the jihadist 
environment for value-related reasons like sense of justice, freedom, oppression against 
Islam and also because they are concerned about their afterlife and their soul. This is 
different from the right-wing environment. However, despite the differences in content and 
ideology, the processes of radicalisation itself is often similar for both members of German 
radical right groups and Dutch returning jihadists. There have been even cases of German 
right-wing radicals who have converted to Islam and are currently fighting as jihadists 
abroad (interview Koehler). As stated before in 1.2, ways to develop de-radicalisation 
programmes, some scholars have argued that ideological motives are rarely the real reason 
for joining radical movements. Factors that do play a part in the decision to join the radical 
right movement in Germany include sympathy for the underdog position of the radical right 
versus radical and violent opponents. Other factors are protection against enemies and 
perceived (foreign) threats, curiosity, looking for sensation and rebelling against the older 
generations. Furthermore, there is a search for an alternative to family or parents and for 
friends or community. Moreover, there is a quest for status and/or identity. Radical right 
members are also much influenced by the media (Van der Valk, et al, 2010: 15-16). These 
reasons for joining the radical-right movement are to a large extent the same as the reasons 
jihadists have for joining radical Islamic movements. Like members of the radical right in 
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Germany, it appears that Dutch jihadists usually do not join the movement for ideological 
reasons. They can, however, be formed ideologically, and can radicalise while they are 
active in the movement or fighting in Syria. Furthermore many Dutch jihadists argue that 
they want to stand up for their ‘Muslim brothers’ who are being oppressed, and they want to 
help overthrow the Assad regime (interview Pannekoek). This is where factors such as a 
sense of injustice, protection against enemies and perceived (foreign) threats come into play. 
Maybe we can even see sympathy for the underdog versus radical and violent opponents as 
a part of this. Moreover, the search for an alternative identity and the greater respect that 
jihadists hope to find in the jihadist community, are similar to the motivation for joining 
radical-right movements. As the senior policy maker stated (interview), jihadist propaganda 
also provides alternatives since it offers a way out of the criminal environment and to 
improve their lives. 
  Muslims who radicalise are mostly second and third generations migrants (interview 
Pannekoek). This is in contrast to their parents, who are first generation immigrants, and 
who have a reference point in their country of origin. They know how Islam was practiced 
in the home country; they were schooled in that way. Youngsters of the second and third 
generation do not have this knowledge. It is also one of the reasons why these young people 
are prone to criminal behaviour. They speak almost no Arabic, do not know the Koran well, 
and when they reach puberty they may suffer an identity crisis because they are not 
considered Moroccan in Morocco, or Dutch in the Netherlands. These young people start 
identifying with the universal Muslim community and many radical Muslim movements 
use these feelings to recruit new members. The youngsters are susceptible to these 
movements since they give them an identity; they feel they are all in it together and that the 
others will help them if they get into trouble. The first generation was less susceptible to 
radicalisation (interview Pannekoek). This search for an identity, an alternative family, not 
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feeling socially accepted, and the search for community also influences the radical-right 
radicalisation process.     
 
Background 
It is noteworthy that social-economic circumstances seem to play a limited role in the 
radicalisation process of Muslims. According to the senior policy maker of the Ministry of 
Security and Justice (interview), jihadists come from very diverse backgrounds. For 
example, some of the jihadists travelling to Syria have no schooling and a criminal 
background, while others are highly educated intellectuals. However, for people with a 
criminal background the fighting in Syria can mean a new start in life; it is an alternative 
career opportunity for them (interview senior policy maker). Furthermore, jihadists have 
different family backgrounds. There have been cases of jihadists whose parents were 
atheists or were divorced. Sometimes it is the parents who notice the radicalisation process 
when their children start to eat different food, stop drinking alcohol and start wearing 
different clothes. Some parents respond to these developments by hiding the Koran or 
prohibiting them from praying five times a day. Recruiters can use such reactions as proof of 
an international conspiracy against Islam (interview Pannekoek).   
 It is interesting to note that social-economic circumstances also seem to play a limited 
role in the decision to join the radical-right movement in Germany. Many members of right-
wing radical groups have good living standards. However, youngsters who join radical 
movements often do not feel socially accepted and they experience many conflicts in their 
social life. Troubled relationships at home, with parents, seem to be a more important factor. 
In many of the families in which these radicalised persons grew up, there is an absence of 
communication and emotional closeness. This corresponds to a lack of skills among young 
people and a lack of self-esteem. The societal integration skills of these youngsters are often 
poorly developed, which influences their functioning at school and in the workplace. It also 
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has an impact on their overall social participation. Linking up with radical-right movements 
provides compensation for this. There is however not one way but many ways in which 
people become part of the radical-right movement (Van der Valk, et al, 2010: 15-16).  
 
The threat posed 
Both radical groups can form the same direct threat, since they are able and willing to 
commit direct violent attacks. Moreover, Dutch jihadists and German right-wing radicals 
pose the same threat to society as their actions can give rise to social polarisation.11  
 If they are part of the radical-right movement for a long period of time, members 
become more and more involved in violent confrontations. Violent victories over enemies 
(extreme-left, anarchists) and defeats (arrests) lead to more group bonding and cohesion. 
This makes it harder to leave their environment. Furthermore these violent actions make it 
harder to stay in close contact with their relatives. So, the longer a person is part of a radical 
group, the harder it is to leave the group. If they do decide to leave the radical-right group, 
the disengagers may face harsh punishment from the movement. Some radical right 
movements even have kill squads for dropouts (interview Koehler). This could also be the 
case with jihadists returnees. De-radicalising returnees face problems from support groups 
of the global jihad who want to frustrate their reintegration and may even threaten them 
since they are considered traitors (Bakker, et al, 2013: 8).   
Although German right-wing radical groups react aggressively towards disengagers, 
according to Koehler there are more problems with civil society accepting the dropout than 
with the former radical group (interview Koehler). There is little information available 
about how society in general responds to returnees (interview senior policy maker). 
                                                 
11
 General Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands (2014), https://www.aivd.nl/@3111/heropleving/ 
(visited on October 22nd 2014). 
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However, the negative coverage in the Dutch media of Dutch jihadists fighting in Syria 
could have unfavourable consequences for the social acceptance of returnees.    
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion we can state that, in general, there are differences between the 
respective situations of members of the German radical right and of returning jihadists, but 
there are also a significant number of similarities. Most of the overlap is in the area of why 
persons feel attracted to such movements. Convictions and ideology do often not play a 
major role in the early phase of radicalisation. Ideological radicalisation usually occurs in the 
second phase. Knowing this, we can state that key aspects of the radicalisation of both 
German right-wing radicals and Dutch returning jihadists mean that the two groups are to a 
certain extent comparable.  
 
2.2 Main programme elements regarding terrorist solutions 
This paragraph will examine whether we should focus on de-radicalisation or 
disengagement, on whether or not governmental institutions should carry out the 
programmes and whether we should actively approach Dutch jihadists. These discussions 
happen to be key issues for developing ‘de-radicalisation’ programmes. Furthermore will be 
discussed which are the main programme elements of Hayat. Since we already know that 
key elements regarding the radicalisation of German right-wing radicals and Dutch 
returning jihadists are comparable, we will investigate which (part of) policies and practices 
should – if possible – be transferred to the Netherlands. Therefore we should first 
investigate how Hayat and EXIT programmes work and in which environment they 
operate.  
 
 
  
 
 
Henrique Franssens: Reducing the risks posed by Dutch returnees from Syria 
61 
Summer/15 
Nr. 3 
ISSN: 2363-9849         
Hayat’s environment and its way of working 
In 2009, Germany considered itself at risk because of an increased threat of 
international Islamists terrorism. Especially with the increase in the number of German 
Islamists willing to engage in violence, who were leaving the country to join jihadist 
organisations abroad. Apart from taking a large number of measures, Germany looked for a 
way to play an active role in the prevention of Islamism and in de-radicalisation which lead 
to the ‘AG Deradikalisierung’ (Endres, 2014: 4). This AG Deradikalisierung was divided 
into different sub-working groups, leading to “the widest possible assortment of topic ranges 
relating to the area of de-radicalisation” (Endres, 2014: 4). This included preventive 
programmes focussing on the deconstruction of the jihadists ideology and programmes 
focussing on the radicalised individual through direct communication in order to achieve de-
radicalisation (Endres, 2014: 4). The German security services also found of importance 
“the fact that relatives and social environment of radicalised individuals find themselves in a 
situation of particular strain, and at the same time may well be able to play a significant role 
in a successful de-radicalisation (Endres, 2014: 5).  
The working group that is responsible for providing counselling and support for the 
environment of the radicalised individuals is led by the German Federal Office for 
Migration and Refugees (BAMF). In order to do their work effectively they found it 
necessary to involve both parties from the civil society and a central state-run contact and 
coordination point (Endres, 2014: 5). The Federal Ministry of Interior finances the 
positions of the employees and Hayat is from the start one of the institutions that are in a 
partnership with the BAMF. Other current partners are VAJA and its ‘kitab’ counselling 
centre in Bremen, who are busy with cases in North Germany. In the South of Germany is 
the Violence Prevention Network (VPN) dealing as a partner of the BAMF (Endres, 2014: 
6-7) and in the West the IFAK e.V. association in Bochum.  
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One of the central strategies of the BAMF regarding German jihadists is a 
counselling approach. “Since January 2012, the BAMF has been providing a nationwide 
Advice Centre for everyone seeking advice and help because they feel, or have concrete 
reasons to believe, that someone within their social environment is becoming increasingly 
radicalised in an Islamist direction” (Endres, 2014: 2). This strategy focuses on the whole 
environment of radicals including relatives, teachers and friends advising them how to deal 
with the situation. The BAMF can for instance supply a local cooperation partner that is 
able to counselling. “The initial aim is to provide reinforcement for the radicalised 
individual’s social environment, lessening the strain on the persons involved and thereby 
preventing any breakdown in communication between those in search of counselling and 
the individual in question” (Endres, 2014: 1). 
The BAMF and its partners have set up the first nationwide point of contact for 
people who need advice. This initiative was encouraged and promoted by the Federal 
Ministry of the Interior (Endres, 2014: 17).  According to Endres this counselling system 
“using one authority as the initial point of contact and coordinating body in conjunction 
with civil society institutions as cooperation partners” (Endres, 2014: 17) has turned out 
highly efficient. 
 Anyone who wants to get in contact with the BAMF’s Advice Centre can call the 
hotline or send an email. When the caller has described the situation, the BAMF employee 
determines what is required and gives advice. Often, during this phone call, detailed 
information is given which makes it possible to discern key factors that have turned the 
individual towards radicalism such as e.g. identity crisis, problems at school or work or 
conflicts within the family (Endres, 2014: 7). The caller will subsequently be offered to get 
in touch with one of the partners, free of charge. Depending on the region and whether one 
of the partners is experienced, it will be determined who will be responsible for helping. 
Unless aspects emerge that are relevant in security terms, callers will be guaranteed 
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confidentiality (Endres, 2014: 7). This is where Hayat can start playing a role. If Hayat is 
appointed as the partner who will be dealing with the case, there will be personal meetings 
between the counselling team and the one(s) seeking for advice. This phase is important to 
build a trusting relationship with those asking for help (Endres, 2014: 8). In this early phase, 
attention is given especially to which scene somebody is moving to, the reasons for joining a 
radical movement and concrete information regarding visits to mosques and activities on the 
internet in order to get a clear picture (Endres, 2014: 9). An important role that the partner, 
such as Hayat, plays here is developing a strategy how to initiate the shift towards de-
radicalisation. Special attention has to be given here to the needs of the radicalised person. 
Furthermore, attention is given to the ways the environment communicates with the 
radicalised person. Subsequently other institutions can be involved in the de-radicalisation 
process such as official bodies and schools. It is of most importance to make the radicalised 
person aware of suitable alternatives. In general different conversations are needed in order 
to provide good help (Endres, 2014: 9-10). During this entire process, Hayat has to provide 
regular updates of the counselling process to the BAMF. “And should developments emerge 
that are of relevance in security terms, or should it become necessary to involve the security 
services, the BAMF coordinates these cases, acting as the interface between these 
authorities and the cooperation partners” (Endres, 2014: 9). Another role that Hayat, and 
other counselling partners, can play is putting relatives of different extremist individuals in 
touch so they can exchange stories with people who experience the same (Endres, 2014: 
10).  
This way of working of Hayat is an affective approach. This approach “aims to 
provide the individual with emotional support and to create an alternative peer group to 
counteract the radical affective structure of the individual” (Endres, 2014: 3). The aim of 
providing counselling is to offer support to the social environment of the radicalised 
individual, and by doing that creating the kind of support system necessary for a de-
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radicalisation process. The environment of the radicalised person seems to be the final point 
of contact with mainstream society. Therefore the environment plays a crucial role. 
Furthermore does the environment often recognise radicalisation in an early phase (Endres, 
2014: 3). Key elements of the Hayat and EXIT-Deutschland programme are according to 
Koehler looking where the people are when they contact the BAMF and designing and 
handcrafting the de-radicalisation process for that person. There is a big difference between 
someone who has studied philosophy, was a group leader and wants to leave, and on the 
other hand a seventeen-year-old skinhead who just needs a new job and a little bit of talking 
about the group. Each individual requires a different approach (Interview Koehler). 
According to Koehler, key to success is always talking about ideology, right from the start. 
This means talking about what the individual has internalised from the radical ideology; 
what symptoms or what threats from the ideology. Maybe that person has only joined the 
group because of its stance on environmental protection. EXIT-Deutschland tries to 
determine which philosophy, values, and motivational factors were the driving forces 
behind the decision to enter these movements, and what kept them going. Subsequently it is 
tried to dismantle these forces by providing positive alternatives (Interview Koehler). 
However, as mentioned before, this research has not find any objective external evaluation 
regarding the effectiveness of the Hayat and EXIT-Deutschland programme focussing on 
the ideology.  
 
De-radicalisation or disengagement? 
There are different views as to whether programmes should focus on de-
radicalisation or disengagement, as described in 1.2. Some scholars argue that 
disengagement is far more effective. Even though views on this issue differ, it has become 
clear that disengagement is easier to achieve than de-radicalisation. But, according to other 
scholars, if it can be achieved, de-radicalisation is more sustainable. Disengagement is more 
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likely to happen before de-radicalisation than the other way around.12 Furthermore, 
questions arise about the evaluation of different de-radicalisation programmes. How can you 
measure whether an individual has stopped having radical ideological values? For the 
purpose of this research the “disengagement from terrorist activities” approach is preferred 
to de-radicalisation. This approach is preferred because it is a more objective definition, and 
because while still very difficult, this definition makes it easier to measure the success of 
projects aimed at combating radicalisation. Moreover, it would help the Dutch government 
to avoid the dilemma posed by projects that involve actively trying to change the political, 
religious and other ideas of its citizens, something it would be very reluctant to do.   
 This research argues that with the increasing number of Dutch (returning) Jihadists, 
the Dutch government should focus first on disengagement. That does not imply that de-
radicalisation is not worthwhile. Disengagement often appears to be the first step in the 
direction of de-radicalisation.13 De-radicalisation could be a next step at a later moment in 
time. This research therefore suggests starting with the transfer of the basic ideas and 
approach of the Hayat and EXIT-Deutschland programmes into a Dutch programme, while 
focusing on disengagement. In the future, when things settle down, the Dutch programme 
could move into a de-radicalisation programme.  
 
Governmental vs non-governmental institutions 
At present the Dutch government seems to be leaning in the direction of 
disengagement, which is an attitude more in keeping with the country’s democratic 
principles. Many Western democratic countries regard personal/ideological freedom as a 
                                                 
12
 General Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands (2010), https://toolbox-
extremisme.nctv.nl/documentatie/onderzoeken/disengagement-en-deradicalisering-van-jihadisten-in-nederland 
(visited on October 20th 2014). 
13
 General Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands (2010), https://toolbox-
extremisme.nctv.nl/documentatie/onderzoeken/disengagement-en-deradicalisering-van-jihadisten-in-nederland 
(visited on October 20th 2014). 
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very important value. The comprehensive action programme set up by the Dutch 
government to combat jihadism, contains only a vague reference to plans to develop a 
programme based on the German Hayat programme as well as an exit facility. However, it 
is not clear whether the Dutch government will do this on its own or if it plans to designate 
responsibility to another (non-state) actor. If the Dutch government decides to do it by itself, 
it should focus only on disengagement. Koehler states that EXIT-Deutschland has problems 
with its legal status since it has to hand over some aspects of its job to the police and other 
agencies (e.g. providing a new identity and police protection). However, Koehler states that 
a separation of powers within a democracy is important, he believes that the only 
institutions that should be able to issue a new identity are the courts and the police. 
Therefore, Koehler suggests that acquiring an expert witness status would make it easier to 
ask for assistance and allow the organisation to bypass certain bureaucratic procedures. 
Furthermore, with expert witness status, statements made in court would carry more weight 
(interview Koehler). This issue seems to be taken into account within Hayat partnership 
within the German nationwide counselling network, were they have close contact. 
According to Endres this counselling system has been “using one authority as the initial 
point of contact and coordinating body in conjunction with civil society institutions as 
cooperation partners” (Endres, 2014: 17) turned out highly efficient. Whatever precise roles 
it will get, any exit or support facility should have a structured co-operation with the existing 
authorities laid down in a firm legal framework. It will be a public private partnership. 
 If the Dutch government carries out the programme by itself, it would not face the 
legal issues that EXIT has. However, in order to be able to move the (disengagement) 
programme towards a de-radicalisation programme at some point in the future, NGO status 
would be preferable. In that case, the Dutch government should designate the appropriate 
people. Setting up an organisation with NGO status could also make it easier to build a 
relationship of trust between the radicals and the organisation. If this NGO would get an 
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expert witness status part of the disadvantages of not being a governmental organisation, is 
mitigated. Furthermore should there be a close cooperation between the NGO and the 
central government.  
 
Actively approaching returnees and their environment 
Although the two German NGOs, Hayat and EXIT-Deutschland, wait until they 
are approached by a returnee or a family member, German governmental programmes 
actively approach radicalised right-wing individuals (e.g. The BIG REX programme). Given 
the Dutch governmental view that each returnee is a potential threat, it does not passively 
wait until being approached by a returnee. This more active approach could suit the Dutch 
authorities, since they also take a more active approach to identifying and contacting 
returnees. However, questions arise regarding the legitimacy and trust. Only if returnees are 
suspected of having committed any illegal activity, they have to respond to the authorities. 
Otherwise cooperation will have to be on a voluntary basis.    
 Identifying and monitoring returnees is quite difficult. Since Dutch jihadists can 
easily travel to Turkey, which is covered by the Schengen agreement (no passport is 
required, an identity card is sufficient), it is difficult to stop and identify people who are 
travelling to Syria (interview senior policy maker). It is even harder to prove what people’s 
intentions were and/or what they have done in Syria. Most of the people fighting in Syria 
are identified via direct family members or friends who have contact with the jihadist 
(Bakker, et al, 2013: 5). The government does not have the capacity to conduct non-stop 
monitoring of all returning jihadists. Since the government depends on the direct social 
environment of the jihadists for information, it should maintain a good, close relationship 
with this environment and also approach it actively. This way the authorities can more 
easily identify jihadists who have travelled abroad and returned home, and it may also make 
it easier to determine what the motives are for returning and if the individuals in question 
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are traumatised. So, for the timely detection of jihadists and prevention of terrorist activities 
in the Netherlands (or other Western European countries), the authorities should avoid 
harsh, repressive measures with long sentences, as this would widen the gap between them 
and the returnee’s environment. Good contacts with the returnee’s social environment are 
an essential part of the effective treatment of returnees.  
 
Hayat’s and EXIT-Deutschland’s main elements? 
Although it is impossible to draw scientific conclusions about the effectiveness of Hayat 
and EXIT-Deutschland due to the lack of evaluative studies, the Dutch government wants 
to transfer these programmes. Based on literature and interviews it shows that Hayat and 
EXIT seem to have some main elements that are given a lot of attention. We have also seen 
that some aspects of the programmes should not be transferred to the Netherlands (active 
versus passive approach, NGO or governmental, directed at disengagement or de-
radicalisation). The main elements that should be considered for the Dutch programs are:
  
- Focusing on individuals, processing personal history and focusing on the reasons for 
joining the movement.   
- The necessity to build a relationship of trust between the radical and employee. Having a 
trusting relationship also helps such programmes serve as a bridge between society and 
security. 
- Strict contracts are another feature of all of the German programmes. These are helpful 
because they contain very clear details of exactly what is expected from each party.   
- Taking the individual out of their old environment and not letting them have contact 
with any person from that old environment (providing protection if necessary).  
- Reintegration into society (helping with a new social network/finding a job). 
- Providing psychiatric support. 
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- Providing emotional support.  
- The institutions serve as a bridge between society and security authorities. 
- Attention should be paid to detecting and resolving potential conflicts within the family.  
- Helping relatives to develop argumentations and ideological narratives that can counter 
those of the radicalised youngster (this is not a theological debate!).   
- Trying to break through the radicalised person’s ideological isolation by giving them the 
option of abandoning radical structures.  
- Providing returnees with alternatives is a key element for diminishing the danger that 
returnees pose to society. It is also a means of establishing an alternative reference group, 
and of taking individuals out of their old environment.  
- A personal profile is created at the beginning of the de-radicalisation process in the 
German governmental programmes, as well as in those run by Hayat and EXIT-
Deutschland.  
- In general: Focusing on positive measures and to a lesser extent on repressive measures. 
In Germany, different kinds of repressive measures, such as banning manifestations, 
flags, symbols, etc. have also produced negative results. As repressive measures have so 
far been unable to stop the growth of radical-right violence, more preventive measures 
are now being introduced. 
 
Conclusion 
It is difficult to state whether the overall working methods of Hayat and EXIT-
Deutschland are the best practices since there is a lack of evaluative studies. However it has 
become clear which main elements of Hayat and EXIT-Deutschland’s are used for their 
programmes. This research recommends building a Dutch exit facility based on the Hayat 
and EXIT-Deutschland models, but focusing on disengaging instead of de-radicalisation. In 
the future, when things settle down, the facility could evolve into a de-radicalisation 
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programme. Furthermore, this research advises setting up an NGO with expert witness 
status with a close cooperation with the central government. This would be the best possible 
solution as the organisation would have the advantages of a non-governmental body, but 
could still avoid some of the disadvantages of being a non-governmental organisation. Lastly, 
this research is of the opinion that an active approach to contacting returnees fits in best 
with the Dutch government’s objectives. This research sees a number of main elements that 
could – provided there are no other constraints (e.g. legal, social, political, etc.) – be 
transferred to the Netherlands. These elements include using a personal approach (defined 
in greater detail above), providing returnees with alternatives and family counselling, and 
generally focusing on positive measures.  
 
2.3 Transferability 
This paragraph will investigate whether Hayat’s and EXIT’s main elements 
described above, can indeed be transferred to the Netherlands. In previous paragraphs it 
became clear that key aspects of the radicalisation of German right-wing radicals and Dutch 
returning jihadists can be compared. Furthermore this research has made recommendations 
as to how the Dutch exit-facility should work. However, we still do not know if and how 
these German main programme elements can be effectively transferred to the Netherlands. 
This chapter will make use of the policy transfer theory provided in 1.1. Rose’s hypotheses 
with regard to policy transfer theory will be applied, as will the conditions formulated by 
Stone, Dolowitz and Marsh.   
 
Type of lesson drawing 
The Dutch government has stated in its action programme to combat jihadism that it 
would like to introduce a programme based on the German Hayat programme, and to 
develop an exit-facility (Ministry of Justice and Security, 2014: 8-17). Furthermore, since 
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the Netherlands has almost no experience in dealing with returning jihadist fighters, we can 
assume that the Netherlands can learn from more experienced countries like Germany. The 
type of lesson drawing discussed in this thesis is a clear case of what is called voluntary 
policy transfer. However, since we can speak of the returnee problem as a European 
problem it might also have elements of an indirect coercive transfer. With the indirect 
coercive transfer the potential role of externalities and functional interdependence play a 
major part.           
   
Main elements of Hayat and EXIT-Deutschland and the existing Dutch measures 
Since this research will focus on whether German Hayat’s and EXIT-Deutschland’s 
main elements can be transferred to the Netherlands, the different regulations, legislation 
and other contextual variables in each country make it impossible to copy every detail. 
Emulation seems the best way of lesson drawing here, which implies the adoption of a 
programme including adjustments for different circumstances in another jurisdiction, and 
rejects the idea of copying every detail (Rose, 1991: 21). In previous paragraph, main 
programme elements regarding terrorist solutions, it has become clear which main elements 
of the Hayat and EXIT-Deutschland programmes could be transferred to the Netherlands.  
In order to determine how these programme elements could serve as additional 
instruments it is important to understand the existing national schemes and plans in the 
Netherlands. Looking at the existing national schemes and plans it looks like most of the 
Dutch policies and practices regarding returnees seem to focus on legislative/repressive 
measures. The Dutch policy regarding returnees is currently to prosecute them based on the 
principle of discretionary prosecution if there is enough evidence proving that they have 
committed crimes abroad. If prosecution is impossible, different measures will be applied in 
order to reduce the threat they may pose (Centre for Security Studies, 2014: 13). An 
example is placing someone under long-term supervision, based on criminal law (Ministry 
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of Security and Justice, 2014: 5). According to the Dutch government, the intention is to 
increase the resilience of groups and individuals in relation to radicalism and to enhance 
their ties to Dutch society and more generally to the democratic rule of law.14 But 
investigating the measures, the focus of most measures seems to be on the punishment of the 
jihadist and/or on the immediate protection of society. Little attention is given to the 
individual or to how to make him or her a more civil and less radical person. The Dutch 
government’s action programme contains plans for ‘soft’, preventive measures but they are 
only explained in vague terms. Moreover, while the senior policy maker (interview) has a 
stated preference for ‘soft’ measures, this strategy is often criticised in the current political 
climate. It may be that repressive measures themselves make it more difficult to implement 
soft policies. Furthermore, it seems complicated to deal with two different measures that are 
at opposite ends of the range of possible actions. However, some attention is also given to the 
jihadist as an individual human being who wants to change. The action programme to 
combat jihadism states that returnees who are traumatised or disillusioned and want to leave 
the jihadist movement, can get consular assistance from Dutch embassies.15 However, no 
specific details are given of how this works in practice.   
Knowing the main elements of Hayat and EXIT-Deutschland and the existing 
Dutch measures, we can identify which measures have not yet been applied in the 
Netherlands and could therefore be transferred to the Netherlands, provided other relevant 
requirements can also be met. The legal implications seem to be in the area of de-
radicalisation, should the Dutch government decide to carry out the programmes by itself. 
This would also mean acting as a bridge between society and security authorities. For the 
rest, all other essential elements of the Hayat and EXIT-Deutschland programmes seem 
suitable for transfer to the Netherlands. As described in the previous paragraph, main 
                                                 
14
 National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (2005), http://www.nctv.nl/Images/22-12-2005-
beleidskader-aanpak-radicaliseringshaarden_tcm126-443848.pdf (visited on April 26th 2014).  
15
 NOS (2014), http://nos.nl/artikel/2004614-a-cha-na-jihadreis-terug-in-nederland.html (visited on December 12th). 
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programme elements regarding terrorist solutions, this research recommends actively 
approaching returnees instead of waiting to be contacted as with the Hayat and EXIT-
Deutschland programmes. The next section will determine to what extent Hayat’s and 
EXIT-Deutschland’s main elements can be transferred to the Netherlands to supplement 
existing practices and plans. 
 
Transferability 
In order to study whether the conditions in the Netherlands make it likely that a 
successful transfer of policies from Germany can take place, we will use the six hypotheses 
given by Rose (1988: 227-228). The first hypothesis states that (1) Programmes with single 
goals are easier to transfer than programmes with multiple goals. The main goal of the Hayat 
and EXIT-Deutschland programmes is to de-radicalise (in terms of ideology) radicals. 
Although other sub-objectives, such as reintegrating the radical into society or finding a new 
environment, may have to be met in order to reach the main goal, it is still a single-goal 
programme. The aim of the Dutch government is to reduce the risks associated with Dutch 
returnees from Syria (interview senior policy maker). Though the objective of the Dutch 
government is different from the objective of the Hayat programme, these objectives are not 
contradictory. In the future, the Hayat and EXIT-Deutschland objectives could be regarded 
as possible sub-objectives of the Dutch objective. So, based on this first hypothesis, it seems 
that elements of the German programmes could in principle be transferred to the 
Netherlands.  The next hypothesis states that (2) The simpler the problem, the more likely 
transfer will occur. In the case of the jihadists, the problem is rather complex since there are 
many reasons why people go to Syria, return and de-radicalise. There is no single approach 
that can be used, there is no ‘one size fits all’ solution for all these individuals (interview 
Pannekoek). A person-centred approach seems to be the most suitable as discussed in the 
previous chapter. Furthermore, society has strong and diverse thoughts about returnees, 
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which could make it harder to integrate returnees back into society (interview senior policy 
maker). As the senior policy maker (interview) stated, the public and politicians demand 
harsh (repressive) measures which are often not the best solutions. Due to the individual 
approach and the different visions of the programme, it is a rather complex programme. 
Given the terms of this hypothesis, transfer is therefore less likely to occur.   
 The third hypothesis states that (3) The more direct the relationship between the 
problem and the solution, the more likely it is that transfer will occur. Since the ‘solution’ is 
directly aimed at and focused on the problem we can state that there is a direct relationship. 
Therefore, according to this hypothesis transfer is likely to occur.    
 Hypothesis four states that (4) The fewer the perceived side effects a policy has, the 
more likely transfer will occur. The person-centred approach used by Hayat and EXIT-
Deutschland involves serious risks. These include security risks resulting from a faulty 
threat analysis, lack of standards and risks of aiding terrorists who play along. It could be 
that the radical environment of the returnee will react hostile to the de-radicalisation and 
disengagement programmes and their employees. This has happened to EXIT-Deutschland 
and its employees, although – as yet - never as direct physical attacks. Furthermore, given 
the political pressure to implement more harsh, repressive policies and practices the 
programme is likely to be criticised as being too “soft”. Linked implications for success are 
the repressive measures themselves, which make it more difficult to implement soft policies. 
Furthermore, it seems hard to deal with two different measures that are at opposite ends of 
the scale. All in all, there seems to be quite some side effects. Especially the security risks 
involved need to be question critically in order to determine to what extent civil society 
actors, such as Hayat and EXIT, can deal with these risks. Therefore, according to this 
hypothesis, transfer seems unlikely to occur. The following hypothesis states that (5) The 
more information agents have about the functioning of a programme in another country, the 
easier it is to transfer. Since Germany and the Netherlands are neighbours, the two 
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countries work together successfully on different matters such as economy, culture, and 
administration.16 Both countries try to stimulate good communications and attach value to 
maintaining a high level of trust.17 Furthermore, from my own experience while writing this 
research, the former head of research of Hayat and EXIT-Deutschland, Daniel Koehler, 
was very helpful in providing the information needed with interviews and providing 
literature. Therefore, gathering information from Germany and specifically from Hayat and 
EXIT-Deutschland seems to be easy. Moreover, most the information about the working 
methods of Hayat and EXIT-Deutschland do not involve confidential information. 
However, some methods seem deemed to be protected skills. Additionally, reducing the risk 
that returnees can pose in the Netherlands is also in the interest of Germany as it provides a 
means of monitoring returnees throughout the region. Returnees arriving in the 
Netherlands could also form a threat to Germany, as was the case with an attack on a Jewish 
museum in Belgium, which was committed by a French returnee.18 So apart from good 
communication and a trusting relationship, it is also in German’s own interest to have a 
stable neighbouring country. Therefore, in light of this hypothesis, transfer seems relatively 
easy to accomplish. The last hypothesis states that (6) The more easily outcomes can be 
predicted, the simpler a programme is to transfer. Because they are person-centred, it is hard 
to predict the outcomes of the Hayat and EXIT-Deutschland programmes, since each case is 
different and the effect not easily measured. As stated before, each radical has different 
reasons for joining, returning and de-radicalising. Based on this last hypothesis, the 
programmes would be quite difficult to transfer.    
      
                                                 
16
 Government of the Netherlands (2014), http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/betrekkingen-met-
nederland/duitsland (visited on November 15th 2014).  
17
 Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Berlin, Germany (2014), http://duitsland.nlambassade.org/themas 
(visited on November 15th 2014).  
18
 Van den Dool, P. (2014), ‘Verdachte aanslag Joods Museum Brussel aangeklaagd voor moord’, 
http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2014/07/30/verdachte-aanslag-joods-museum-brussel-aangeklaagd-voor-moord/,  (visited 
on September 9
th
 2014).  
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In conclusion, three of Rose’s six hypotheses as tested above predict that policy 
transfer is likely to occur or is easy to accomplish (hypotheses 1, 3 and 5). By contrast, the 
outcomes of the other three hypotheses indicate that it will be difficult or less likely that 
successful policy transfer will occur (hypotheses 2, 4 and 6). On the basis of Rose’s 
hypotheses the chances for successful transfer are therefore divided. If the Netherlands still 
wants to transfer the Hayat and EXIT-Deutschland programmes, some adjustments will be 
needed in order to improve the chance of success. The complexity of the problem cannot be 
made simpler, and hence the problems described in hypothesis two cannot be changed. 
However, the possible side effects discussed in hypothesis four, which are related to the 
(security) risks and political pressure to implement more harsh, repressive policies and 
practices could be dealt with. The danger posed to programme employees can be dealt with, 
partly by paying more attention to the issue and trying to combat it. The (security) risks can 
also be tried to reduce by employing experienced staff and train them well. Furthermore can 
a close cooperation with the central government, like the German nationwide counselling 
network, be helpful to deal with this problem. Especially since Hayat is a civil society 
organisation that is not experienced and aligned to dealing with these kind of issues. 
Furthermore, the political pressure can be done with the help of Stone’s remarks regarding 
the ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ forms of policy transfer (Stone, 2004: 546). According to Stone (2004: 
556), anyone wanting to transfer policy, should first focus on the ‘soft’ forms of policy 
transfer, which might involve promoting norms and knowledge. This needs to be done by 
non-state actors who are better at influencing public opinion and policy agendas. 
Afterwards, the Dutch government can transfer the policy tools and structures which 
constitute the ‘hard’ transfer. So, non-state actors could help to change public opinion and 
try to reduce political pressure by focusing on less restrictive policies and practices. The 
designated actors would be the elected officials who took comprehensive action to set up a 
programme to combat jihadism, and their political parties, experts, interest groups and law 
  
 
 
Henrique Franssens: Reducing the risks posed by Dutch returnees from Syria 
77 
Summer/15 
Nr. 3 
ISSN: 2363-9849         
firms. These experts, interest groups and law firms are non-state actors that could play an 
important part in the ‘soft’ transfer of policy. A number of Dutch lawyers have already 
publicly criticised the more repressive plans laid out in the action programme.19 Other 
resources include the practice of partnering people of Dutch descent with those of 
Moroccan descent (SMN) and starting a hotline for the parents of radicalised youngsters.20 
Moreover, the number of experts and scholars investigating the issue of jihadist returnees, 
and knowledge about this subject, has been increasing. According to Stone, these non-state 
actors are often forgotten in the policy transfer process, but they can be very influential. 
Asking non-state actors for help could reduce the demand for harsh, repressive measures 
and make it possible to overcome this major side effect. In conclusion, the biggest perceived 
side effect can be restricted, thereby improving the chance of successful policy transfer. 
 The last hypothesis that was tested with negative results was the more easily 
outcomes can be predicted, the simpler a programme is to transfer. The complexity of the 
relevant problems would seem to limit the chance of success. However, there are changes 
that could make it easier to predict outcomes, including, for example, using a more 
experienced crew and having a well-run organisation. If all policies and practices are 
coordinated by one institution and they have experienced staff, outcomes are more 
predictable, although never precisely.  
So although the circumstances for successful policy transfer are not optimal they can 
be improved. In addition, other measures can be taken to prevent policy transfer failure. 
The next section will investigate these measures. 
 
 
                                                 
19
 NOS (2014), http://nos.nl/audio/692498-maatregelen-kabinet-tegen-jihadisme-werken-averechts.html.html (visited 
on November 14th 2014).  
20
 SMN (2014), http://www.smn.nl/islam-en-samenleving/smn-start-hulplijn-voor-marokkaanse-ouders-met-
radicaliserende-kinderen (visited on November 14th 2014.  
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Preventing policy transfer failure  
It should not be forgotten that policy transfer is not always successful. The three 
factors that Dolowitz and Marsh (2000: 17) cite as reasons for policy failure are uninformed 
transfer (not having enough information), incomplete transfer (crucial elements for success 
are not transferred) and inappropriate transfer (too little attention is given to the contexts of 
the two countries). In order to prevent these factors from happening, the following matters 
need extra attention: good communication with the German institutions. This can prevent 
uninformed and incomplete transfer.  What is also required is specific and precise research 
regarding the crucial elements for success and an investigation of the contexts of the 
situations in Germany and the Netherlands. This will cost time and money but is definitely 
necessary in order to improve the chances for successful policy transfer.   
 Furthermore we should not forget to investigate the errors that have occurred in 
Germany, so that we can prevent them from happening in the Netherlands when their 
policies and practices are transferred. There are dozens of de-radicalisation projects aiming 
at the radical-right movements in Germany but there is no central German institution which 
is responsible for all radical-right issues or for coordinating all related activities 
(Schellenberg, 2009: 180). Various individual institutions work in their own manner, using 
different approaches and without coordination. It is therefore advisable to have one central 
organisation to coordinate all activities related to Dutch jihadists and returnees. Although 
this is already the task of the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism21, 
Pannekoek (interview) explains that the different governmental institutions that are 
engaged in the fight against Dutch jihadists do not normally work well together. Improving 
cooperation with the help of the National Coordinator should be helpful avoiding this 
problem in the Netherlands. Obstacles to success that where identified at Hayat and EXIT-
                                                 
21
 National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (2014), https://www.nctv.nl/organisatie/ (visited on 
November 11
th
 2014). 
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Deutschland in Germany, which have already been discussed, are: punishment of the drop 
out by their own group, society’s refusal to accept the dropout as a new person, and 
problems related to the protection of their own staff. Other problems have to do with the 
legal status of EXIT-Deutschland as a civil society organisation, which has had to hand over 
some jobs to the police and other agencies (such as providing a new identity and police 
protection). While it is important to respect the need for separation of powers, Koehler 
suggests giving the organisation expert witness status so that requests can be streamlined and 
some bureaucratic procedures can be bypassed. Also, their statements in court could be 
given more weight (interview Koehler). A close cooperation between the civil society 
organisation and the central government, like the German nationwide counselling network, 
can help solving this problem. However, clear agreements should be made since both 
institutions both should not interfere with each others work. As discussed in the previous 
paragraph we therefore recommend that a non-state actor be given responsibility for the 
transfer of projects to the Netherlands, and that they be given expert witness status. 
Additional, a close cooperation between the government and NGO could be helpful. 
Furthermore, before starting this initiative, the Dutch government should estimate their 
costs and available budget as precisely as possible. Although this information can easily be 
obtained from Hayat and EXIT-Deutschland, price differences have to be taken into 
account. The government must ensure that there is enough budget available to deal with the 
problems adequately and to employ the right people. Attention should also be given to the 
question of the protection of the programme’s employees.      
      
Conclusion 
The hypotheses formulated by Rose were used to check whether conditions in the 
Netherlands make it likely that a successful transfer of policies from Germany can take 
place. Three of Rose’s six hypotheses tested above predict that policy transfer is likely to 
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occur or is easy to accomplish (hypothesis 1, 3 and 5). In contrast, the outcomes of the other 
three hypotheses predict that it will be difficult or less likely that successful policy transfer 
will occur (hypothesis 2, 4 and 6). Therefore, based on Rose’s hypotheses the chances for 
successful transfer are mixed, and additional measures will be needed in order to improve 
the chances of successful policy transfer. This could be done by tackling some of the 
possible side effects. Steps should be taken to reduce the involved risks and the political 
pressure to implement only harsh, repressive policies and practices. This can be done with 
the help of Stone’s remarks regarding the ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ forms of policy transfer (Stone, 
2004: 546). Since non-state actors are better in influencing public opinion and political 
agendas, these should play a part here. Furthermore a well-structured organisation is needed 
and the transfer and implementation of all relevant policies and practices should be 
coordinated by this one institution. Additional measures should be taken in order to prevent 
policy transfer failure. These measures include good communication with the German 
institutions as a means of preventing uninformed and incomplete transfer. Moreover 
specific and precise research regarding the main elements and investigating the contexts of 
Germany and the Netherlands should be part of the transfer process. Lastly the National 
Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism should strengthen its role as the central 
organisation responsible for coordinating all activities related to Dutch jihadists and 
returnees and create a good and trustful relationship. All this will cost time and money but is 
definitely necessary in order to improve the chances for the successful transfer of policy. 
 
Part 3: Conclusion 
This chapter will answer the central research question and give some policy 
recommendations and practical implications of the research. Furthermore it will discuss the 
limitations of the research findings and discuss possible avenues for future research.  
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Limitations 
Due to the volatility of the subject of this research, the cut-off point for new material 
was set on October 2014. Hence the time frame of the study is from March 2011 (begin 
Syrian conflict22) to October 2014. This research may therefore contain outdated 
information. The focus of this research is on Dutch returnees. However, this does not imply 
that preventive measures to keep Dutch jihadists from going to Syria are not important. 
Continuous attention and research needs to be done on prevention. This research focuses 
on Dutch returnees from the fighting in Syria and disregards other countries, such as Iraq, 
where foreign fighters are also active. Another aspect is that not all German policies and 
practices were taken fully into account. Therefore, we cannot be sure that this research has 
investigated all actual measures or best practices, although in all likelihood the most 
important features have been taken into account. Lastly it should be noted that it is difficult 
to gain access to reliable and detailed field data regarding foreign fighters. Interviews were 
necessary, but even top governmental officials only wanted to be interviewed anonymously. 
Some of the approached governmental agencies indicated that they had a lot of data but 
they could not share it due to security reasons.  
 
Answering the research question 
As discussed in the introduction, this research investigates To what extend can the main 
elements developed by the Hayat and EXIT-Deutschland institutions, aimed at reducing the 
risks posed by radicals, effectively be transferred to the Netherlands? In order to answer this 
research question, 2.1, comparing Dutch returnees and radical right members investigated if 
Dutch jihadi returnees have a number of similarities with members of the German radical 
right and can therefore be compared. In conclusion we can state that although there are of 
                                                 
22
 Abied, A. (2014), ‘Syrie, politieke impasse, onmenselijke chaos: is er ook een oplossing?’, 
https://lirias.kuleuven.be/handle/123456789/441330 (visited on October 22nd 2014). 
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course differences between the case of the German radical-right members and the case of 
returning Dutch jihadists, there are also a significant number of similarities. Most of the 
overlap relates to the question of why people feel attracted to these movements. Convictions 
and ideology do often not play a major role in that early phase of radicalisation. In most 
cases ideological radicalisation occurs during the second phase, when people are already 
part of the radical group. Knowing this, we can state that certain key characteristics of 
German right-wing radicals and Dutch returning jihadists can be compared. Thereafter in 
2.2, Main programme elements regarding terrorist solutions, it was examined what the main 
programme elements of Hayat and Exit-Deutschland are. This has to be examined in order 
to determine if the main elements could possibly be transferred to the Netherlands. 
Although there is a lack of evaluative studies the Dutch government wants to transfer these 
programmes. Main programme elements include, among others, having a good and close 
relationship with the direct social environment of the radical. Person-centred approaches 
seem to be the most successful. This also includes creating a personal profile at the 
beginning of the de-radicalisation path of the programme. Moreover, strict contracts are 
necessary to manage mutual expectations and attention needs to be given to the background 
of the radical. Providing returnees with alternatives is a key element for diminishing the 
danger that somebody could be for society.  Part two ended with 2.3, transferability, 
investigating whether Hayat’s and Exit-Deutschland’s main elements successfully can be 
transferred to the Netherlands. In order to check if the conditions in the Netherlands make 
it likely that a successful transfer of policies from Germany can take place, the hypotheses 
given by Rose were used. According to Rose (1988: 227-228) the following six hypotheses 
are of interest: 
1. Programmes with single goals are easier to transfer than programmes with multiple 
goals. 
2. The simpler the problem, the more likely transfer is to occur.   
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3. The more direct the relationship between the problem and the solution, the more 
likely it is that transfer will occur. 
4. The fewer the perceived side effects a policy has, the more likely transfer will occur. 
5. The more information agents have about the functioning of a programme in another 
country, the easier it is to transfer. 
6. The more easily outcomes can be predicted, the simpler a programme is to transfer.  
 
Three of the Rose’s six hypotheses tested suggest that policy transfer is likely or can be 
easily accomplished (hypotheses 1, 3 and 5). In contrast the outcomes of the other three 
hypotheses indicate that it will be difficult or less likely that successful policy transfer will 
occur (hypotheses 2, 4 and 6). Therefore, based on Rose’s hypotheses the chances for 
successful transfer are mixed, and additional measures will be needed in order to improve 
the chances of successful policy transfer. This could be done by tackling some of the 
possible side effects. Steps should be taken to reduce the political pressure to implement 
mainly harsh, repressive policies and practices. This can be done with the help of Stone’s 
remarks regarding the ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ forms of policy transfer (Stone, 2004: 546). Since 
non-state actors are better in influencing public opinion and political agendas, these should 
play a part here. Furthermore a well-structured organisation is needed and the transfer and 
implementation of all relevant policies and practices should be coordinated by this one 
institution. The National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism therefore needs to 
strengthen its role as the central organisation responsible for coordinating all activities 
related to Dutch jihadists and returnees. 
In conclusion, although there are certainly differences, important main elements of 
the radicalisation processes of German right-wing radicals and Dutch returning jihadists are 
comparable. Main elements were considered for transfer from Germany to the Netherlands, 
and not the complete instrumentation for implementation. That instrumentation should not 
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be transferred because of the different social, political and legal environment in the 
Netherlands. The conditions for successful policy transfer are not optimal but some 
additional measures can improve the chance of success. So in order to answer the research 
question: To what extend can the main elements developed by the Hayat and EXIT-
Deutschland institutions, aimed at reducing the risks posed by radicals, effectively be 
transferred to the Netherlands?  It can be concluded that several of the main elements of 
HAYAT and EXIT-Deutschland can be transferred, but not all of them. Therefore some 
adjustments are necessary. This research recommends establishing a Dutch programme 
based on elements of Hayat and EXIT-Deutschland, but focusing on (active) disengagement 
instead of (passive) de-radicalisation. In the future, when the organisation is more well-
established, it could evolve into a de-radicalisation programme. This research also 
recommends setting up an NGO with expert witness status so that requests can be 
streamlined and some bureaucratic procedures can be bypassed. Also, their statements in 
court could be given more weight. This would also be better for building a relationship of 
greater trust between the radical and the organisation. A close cooperation between the 
NGO and central government will also be necessary. Since the successful monitoring of 
jihadists and returnees depends on the cooperation of their direct environment, we should 
not discourage people from approaching the Dutch authorities. Implementing only 
repressive measures not only discourages the social environment of the radical from 
cooperating with the state, but has even been shown to have exactly the opposite effect.
 This research foresees a voluntary policy transfer. However, since the returnee 
problem is a European problem, an indirect coercive transfer might also come into play. It is 
hoped that this paper can help to promote the ‘soft’ form of policy transfer, and convince 
people that a mentality change is necessary in order to encourage the acceptance of person-
centred approaches. It may also help to convince the government that it should move away 
from its focus on harsh, repressive measures, which is the result of political and societal 
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pressure, although the action programme combating jihadism has mentioned preventive/ 
individual centred elements. If this mentality does not change there is a significant chance 
of policy failure and the proposed creation of an exit and counselling facility will not be 
feasible since the repressive measures themselves make it more difficult to implement soft 
policies. Furthermore, it seems complicated to deal with two different measures (soft and 
hard) at the same time since they are at opposite ends of the range of potential actions. 
Hopefully this research may help to remove one of the biggest obstacles to successful de-
radicalisation or disengagement, which is society’s refusal to accept the dropout’s return to 
society.  
 
Possible avenues for future research 
During this research it became clear that several subjects are under-researched. 
There is a lack of evaluative studies regarding best practices, historical comparative 
research, a lack of (state of the art) research regarding policy transfer and additional research 
should be carried out to determine to what extent the measures taken and planned by the 
Dutch government contravene democratic principles and the separation of powers. We 
understand that there are significant risks involved and that this is a politically sensitive 
issue, but at first glance, some measures seem inconsistent. Furthermore, more evaluative 
studies are needed in order to determine which methods of de-radicalisation and 
disengagement are best practices. Other countries with experience of de-radicalisation and 
disengagement programmes, such as those in Scandinavia and the United Kingdom, could 
be evaluated. Also additional research could be done to what extent these best practices are 
transferable to other countries. The issue of transferability is under researched and deserves 
more attention in order to determine if best practices abroad can be implemented back 
home. Moreover, more historical comparative research could be done regarding the negative 
attitudes towards the jihadists. If we want to know whether the returning jihadists really 
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form a threat to Dutch society, we have to take an objective, nuanced view of the matter. 
Events such as 9/11 should not be our only framework; we should also look at other 
situations. Foreign fighters are not a new development in the world. Ernest Hemingway 
wrote about the ‘heroes’ who were foreign fighters in Spain against dictator General 
Francisco Franco. During that period tens of thousands of European anarchists, 
communists, and socialists went to Spain to join the international brigades fighting in the 
Spanish Civil War (Bakker, et al, 2013: 2). About 700 Dutchmen and women went to 
Spain to fight against the enemy on the political right. During that period, the Dutch 
government was afraid of what would happen when the fighters returned. They were afraid 
that the fighters would radicalise while in Spain and therefore the government also opposed 
recruitment in the Netherlands. In 1937 a law was introduced that would make Spanish 
returnees stateless; their passports were confiscated and they could not engage in politics. It 
was not until the 1970s that these Spanish veterans got back their Dutch nationality.23 The 
question that arises here is to what extent did these Spanish returnees actually present a 
threat to Dutch society? Or do we now consider some of those returnees as heroes who 
fought fascism during World War II? Perhaps further comparative research regarding 
jihadists could create a better understanding of their cause in Dutch society. Finally, it 
would be interesting to study the extent to which an exclusive focus on repressive measures 
affects the willingness of the immediate personal environment of a jihadist to cooperate with 
the government or the entity responsible for carrying out a disengagement programme. 
                                                 
23
 Burgsma, C. and H. Evrengun (2013), ‘Arie en Sybe vechten tegen Franco – Strijdlustige Nederlanders in de 
Spaanse Burgeroorlog’, http://www.geschiedenis24.nl/andere-tijden/afleveringen/2013-2014/Spaanse-
Burgeroorlog.html (visited on April 26th 2014). 
  
 
 
Henrique Franssens: Reducing the risks posed by Dutch returnees from Syria 
87 
Summer/15 
Nr. 3 
ISSN: 2363-9849         
 
Bibliography 
Abied, A. (2014), ‘Syrie, politieke impasse, onmenselijke chaos: is er ook een oplossing?’, 
https://lirias.kuleuven.be/handle/123456789/441330 (visited on October 22nd 2014). 
 
AD.nl (2014), 
http://www.ad.nl/ad/nl/1012/Nederland/article/detail/3742239/2014/09/07/Al-
minstens-140-Jihadisten-afgereisd-naar-Syrie-of-Irak.dhtml (visited on September 16th 
2014). 
 
Atlas, T. (2013), ‘Foreign Fighters Flocking to Syria Stirs Terror Concerns’, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-19/u-s-stakes-in-syria-grow-as-radicals-rally-to-
the-fight.html  (visited on April 11th 2015). 
 
Bakker, E. (2013), ‘Terugkerende Syrië-gangers’, Magazine nationale veiligheid en 
crisisbeheersing, 11, (4), 4. 
 
Bakker, E, C. Paulussen and E. Entenmann (2013), Dealing with European Foreign Fighters 
in Syria: Governance Challenges & Legal Implications, The Hague: ICCT. 
 
Barnard, A. and E. Schmitt (2013), ‘As Foreign Fighters Flood Syria, Fears of a New 
Extremist Haven’, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/09/world/middleeast/as-foreign-
fighters-flood-syria-fears-of-a-new-extremist-haven.html?_r=0 (visited on May 2th 2014).   
 
Bjørgo, T. and J. Horgan (2009), Leaving terrorism behind: individual and collective 
disengagement, London: Routledge. 
 
Burgsma, C. and H. Evrengun (2013), ‘Arie en Sybe vechten tegen Franco – Strijdlustige 
Nederlanders in de Spaanse Burgeroorlog’, http://www.geschiedenis24.nl/andere-
tijden/afleveringen/2013-2014/Spaanse-Burgeroorlog.html (visited on April 26th 2014). 
 
Centre for Security Studies (2014), Foreign Fighters: An Overview of Responses in Eleven 
Countries, Zurich: ETH Zürich.  
 
Clarke, M. and V. Soria (2010), Terrorism: The New Wave, RUSI Journal, 155, (4), 24-31. 
 
  
 
 
Henrique Franssens: Reducing the risks posed by Dutch returnees from Syria 
88 
Summer/15 
Nr. 3 
ISSN: 2363-9849         
Dolowitz, D.P. and D. Marsh (1996), ‘Who Learns What from Whom: a Review of the 
Policy Transfer Literature’, Politcial Studies, 44, (2), 343-357. 
 
Dolowitz, D.P. and D. Marsh (2000), ‘Learning from Abroad: The Role of Policy Transfer 
in Contemporary Policy-Making’, Governance :  An international Journal of Policy and 
Administration, 13, (1), 5-24.  
 
Dool, P. van den, (2014), ‘Verdachte aanslag Joods Museum Brussel aangeklaagd voor 
moord’, http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2014/07/30/verdachte-aanslag-joods-museum-brussel-
aangeklaagd-voor-moord/,  (visited on September 9th 2014). 
 
Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Berlin, Germany (2014), 
http://duitsland.nlambassade.org/themas (visited on November 15th 2014). 
 
Endres, F. (2014), The Advice Centre on Radicalisation of the Federal Office for Migration 
and Refugees, Journal EXIT-Deutschland, 4, (2), 1-20. 
 
Gadd, D. (2006), ‘The role of recognition in the desistance process: A case analysis of a 
former far-right activist’, Theoretical Criminology, 10, (2), 179-202.  
 
General Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands (2010), https://toolbox-
extremisme.nctv.nl/documentatie/onderzoeken/disengagement-en-deradicalisering-van-
jihadisten-in-nederland (visited on October 20th 2014). 
 
General Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands (2014), 
https://www.aivd.nl/@3111/heropleving/ (visited on October 22nd 2014). 
 
General Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands (2015), 
https://www.aivd.nl/publicaties/@3114/transformation/  (visited on April 11th 2015). 
 
 
Government of the Netherlands (2014), 
http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/betrekkingen-met-nederland/duitsland (visited 
on November 15th 2014). 
 
Hall, S. (1996), Critical dialogues in cultural studies, London: Routledge.  
 
  
 
 
Henrique Franssens: Reducing the risks posed by Dutch returnees from Syria 
89 
Summer/15 
Nr. 3 
ISSN: 2363-9849         
Hegghammer, T. (2013), Should I stay or should I go? Explaining variation in Western 
jihadists’ choice between domestic and foreign fighting, American Political Science Review, 
107, (1), 1-15. 
 
Horgan, J. and Braddock, K. (2010), ‘Rehabilitating the Terrorists? Challenges in Assessing 
the Effectiveness of De-radicalization programs’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 22, (2), 
267-291.  
 
Kaplan, R. D., J. van Oel, K. Armstrong, A. Hirsi Ali, F. Mernissie, A. Bin Oma rand C. 
Reuter (2006), Jihad-Strijders en strijdster voor Allah, Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Byblos. 
 
Koehler, D. (2013), ‘Family Counselling as Prevention and Intervention Tool Against 
‘Foreign Fighters’. The German ‘Hayat’ Program‘, Journal EXIT-Deutschland – Zeitschrift 
für Deradikalisierung und demokratische Kultur, 3, (1), 182-204. 
 
Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Informaiton Center (2014), http://www.terrorism-
info.org.il/en/article/20616 (visited on April 11th 2014). 
 
Ministry of Security and Justice (2014), The Netherlands comprehensive action programme 
to combat jihadism, The Hague: Ministry of Security and Justice.  
 
National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (2005), 
http://www.nctv.nl/Images/22-12-2005-beleidskader-aanpak-
radicaliseringshaarden_tcm126-443848.pdf (visited on April 26th 2014). 
 
National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (2014), 
https://www.nctv.nl/organisatie/ (visited on November 11th 2014). 
 
NOS (2014), http://nos.nl/artikel/2004614-a-cha-na-jihadreis-terug-in-nederland.html 
(visited on December 12th 2014). 
 
NOS (2014), http://nos.nl/audio/692498-maatregelen-kabinet-tegen-jihadisme-werken-
averechts.html.html (visited on November 20th 2014). 
 
Oxford Dictionaries (2014), http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/best-
practice (visited on November 18th). 
 
  
 
 
Henrique Franssens: Reducing the risks posed by Dutch returnees from Syria 
90 
Summer/15 
Nr. 3 
ISSN: 2363-9849         
Pittomvils, K. (1997), Het ABVV, internationaal arbeidsmigraties en ‘gastarbeiders’ in de 
periode 1960-1974: internationalisme versus nationale verdediging, Brussel: Vrije 
Universiteit Brussel.  
 
Rose, R. (1988), Comparative policy analysis: the program approach, Boulder: Westview.  
 
Rose, R. (1991), ‘What is lesson-drawing?’, Journal of Public Policy, 11, (1), 3-30. 
 
Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (2013), Zakboek aanpak ‘uitreizers’, Den Haag: Ministrie 
van Defensie.  
 
Sageman, M. (2010), ‘Confronting Al-Qaeda: Understanding the Threat in Afghanistan’, 
Perspectives on Terrorism ,3, (4), 4-15. 
 
Schellenberg, B. (2009), ‘Strategies for Combating Right-Wing Extremism in Europe’, in: B. 
Stifung, Strategies for Combating Right-Wing Extremism in Europe, Bielefeld: Hans Kock 
Buch- und Offsetdruck GmbH. 
 
Strategie Nationale veiligheid (2009), 
file://vuw/Personal$/Homes/09/s0962309/Downloads/kst-30821-3-b1%20(5).pdf 
(visited on May 5th 2014).  
 
Silke, A. (2011), ‘Disengagement or deradicalization: A look at prison programs for jailed 
terrorists’, CTC Sentinel, 4, (1),18-21.  
 
SMN (2014), http://www.smn.nl/islam-en-samenleving/smn-start-hulplijn-voor-
marokkaanse-ouders-met-radicaliserende-kinderen (visited on November 14th 2014). 
 
Speckhard, A. (2010), Prison and Community Based Disengagement and De-Radicalization 
Programs for Extremists Involved in Militant Jihadi Terrorism Ideologies and Activities, 
Pre-publication Version: Conflict and Terrorism.  
 
Stone, D. (2004), ‘Transfer agents and global networks in the ‘transnationalization’ of 
policy’, Journal of European Public Policy, 11, (3), 545-566.  
 
Trouw (2014), 
http://www.trouw.nl/tr/nl/4496/Buitenland/article/detail/3674515/2014/06/18/Racist
isch-geweld-neemt-fors-toe-in-Duitsland.dhtml (visited on November 14th 2014).   
  
 
 
Henrique Franssens: Reducing the risks posed by Dutch returnees from Syria 
91 
Summer/15 
Nr. 3 
ISSN: 2363-9849         
 
Valk, I. van der, W. Wagenaar and F. Demant (2010), Monitor Racisme & Extremisme: in 
en  
uit extreemrechts, Amsterdam: Anne Frank Stichting/ Amsterdam University Press.  
 
Van den Dool, P. (2014), ‘Verdachte aanslag Joods Museum Brussel aangeklaagd voor 
moord’, http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2014/07/30/verdachte-aanslag-joods-museum-brussel-
aangeklaagd-voor-moord/,  (visited on September 9th 2014). 
 
Volkskrant.nl (2014), 
http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2686/Binnenland/article/detail/3644541/2014/04/29/
Primeur-jihadist-gepakt-na-reis-naar-Syrie.dhtml (visited on September 29th 2014). 
 
Interviews with 
• Donselaar, Dr. J.G. van., Associate Professor – Scientific Director for the Institute of 
Public Administration, Leiden University (April 7th 2014). 
• Koehler, D.,  former Director of Research Operations at the Institute for the Study of 
Radical Movements (April 24th 2014). 
• Pannekoek, M., Researcher at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and analyst of the 
strategic information centre of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee  (April 29th 
2014). 
• Senior policy maker of the Ministry of Security and Justice (June 3rd 2014).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
